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Settlement Should Be the End of Story: A Proposed Procedure to Settle Hatch-Waxman
Paragraph IV Litigations Modeled After Rule 23 Class Action Settlement Procedure
Chika Seidel*
I.

Introduction

A brand-name pharmaceutical company typically obtains a patent for its newly developed
drug in order to protect its intellectual property. If another company expresses its intent to market
a generic version of the drug, the Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes the brand-name company to sue
preemptively for patent infringement.1 Parties to the lawsuit may settle anytime, but antitrust
issues arise when the settlement involves a “reverse payment” in exchange for delayed generic
entry (also called “pay for delay”). The Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis,
Inc. described a reverse payment settlement as follows:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle
under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the
patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee,
to pay B many millions of dollars.2
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) maintains that this type of settlement violates antitrust laws
because it “may lead to higher prices for pharmaceuticals by deterring generic entry, and contribute
to increased healthcare costs that consumers, employers, and federal and state governments are
struggling to contain.”3 A counterargument to this is that an owner of a valid patent is immune
from antitrust violation because he or she has “the right to exclude others from making, using,
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1 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2013).
2 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
3 Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner, FTC v.
Actavis and the Future of Reverse Payment (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-paymentcases/130926actavis.pdf.
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offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .”4 Pharmaceutic a l
companies in the United States are also free to set prices as they wish.5
Lower courts have long disagreed as to the standard by which to analyze reverse payment
settlement agreements for antitrust violations.6 The Actavis Court resolved the dispute by deciding
that such agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason,7 which generally requires a fact
finder to “weigh[] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice [e.g.,
a settlement] should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”8 The
Actavis decision has garnered much criticism for its inadequate guidance, 9 because the Court
“[left] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule of reason antitrust litigation.”10 One
significant problem is that the Court did not rule out the possibility of “litigat[ing] patent valid ity
to answer the antitrust question,”11 which defeats the purpose of settling patent infringement cases.
Furthermore, the Court did not address whether the term “payment” encompasses non-monetary
consideration.

Lower courts already disagree on this issue. 12 Because of these ambiguitie s,

pharmaceutical companies struggle to structure their settlement agreements to avoid antitrust

4

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2013).
Valerie Paris, Why do Americans Spend So Much on Pharmaceuticals? PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:15 PM
EST), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/americans -spend-much-pharmaceuticals/ (discussing that the United
States has relatively low levels of price regulation of pharmaceuticals).
6 Compare, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), with In re K–Dur Antitrust
Litigation, 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
7 Actavis, 133 S. Ct., at 2236 (2013).
8 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (quoting Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
9 See, e.g., Lars P. Taavola, Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch-Insight into How Courts May Structure Reverse
Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions That Actavis Left Unanswered , 40 W M. M IT CHELL L. REV. 1370
(2014); Kevin D. McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, 28 FALL
A NT ITRUST 36 (2013); James J. O'Connell, Editor's Note: The Elephant Remains, 28 FALL A NT ITRUST 5 (2013).
10 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
11 Id. at 2236.
12 Compare, e.g., In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 12-CV-995 WHW, 2014 WL 282755, at *6-7
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (“the Supreme Court considered a reverse payment to involve an exchange of money” and
therefore did “not extend the holding of Actavis to the non-monetary facts before it.”), with In re Loestrin 24 FE
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472-S-PAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123322, at *34 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Reading
Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to monetary settlements”).
5
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scrutiny.
For private parties who wish to bring an antitrust action against settled parties, an initia l
challenge lies in the identification of settlement agreements—if they are even publicly available. 13
Since about 2004, pharmaceutical settlements have evolved to include a complex mix of side deals
as well as non-monetary considerations. 14

Private parties must parse various transactions to

determine whether any of them are related to the potentially anticompetitive agreement. Moreover,
many private consumers are precluded from seeking remedies under the federal or state antitrust
statutes even if they have been injured by overpriced drugs. 15 The situation calls for drastic
measures to remedy these problems.
This Comment will propose a mandatory judicial approval process for settling HatchWaxman litigations modeled after the process of settling class actions pursuant to the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(e). Part II will explain the relevant background information including the
regulatory and legal developments as well as some of the existing problems associated with HatchWaxman disputes. Part III will describe the proposed procedure in detail. Part IV will explain
why the proposed settlement procedure is superior to the current settlement method. Part V will
conclude by summarizing the prominent problems associated with the current method as well as
the proposed procedure and its benefits.
II.

Relevant Legal Developments in the Pharmaceutical Industry

13

The FTC and the Department of Justice have access to pharmaceutical settlement agreements, bu t private parties
do not. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), Pub. L. No. 108–
173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–63.
14 C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Pre serve Drug
Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 649 tbl.2 (2009); BUREAU OF COMPET ITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
A GREEMENT S FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER T HE M EDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT , AND M ODERNIZATION A CT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF A GREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012,
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements -filed-federal-trade-commission-undermedicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf.
15 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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This Comment can be better understood if the reader is familiar with the legal and
economic concerns surrounding the pharmaceutical industry.

Subsection A discusses the

relationship between the patent system and the pharmaceutical industry. Subsection B describes
the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its pertinent provisions. Subsection C summar izes
the circuit split that led to the Actavis decision, Actavis opinion itself, and its aftermath.
A. The Role of Patent System in the Pharmaceutical Industry 16
In order to sustain their businesses, brand-name companies

17

must recover their

investments in drug development. An estimate shows that for every 5000 to 10,000 compounds
that enter the discovery pipeline, only five make it to clinical trials, and only one receives approval
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).18 The development of a single new drug takes an
average of ten to fifteen years, and research and development (R&D) investment per drug could
cost anywhere from $1.2 billion19 to $5 billion.20 These high figures are in part due to high rate of
failure—95% of the experimental medicines fail to be both effective and safe for human use. 21
Even if they reach the market, only 20% of FDA-approved drugs will recoup the cost of R&D.22
Furthermore, brand-name companies suffer a dramatic loss in profits when generic products enter

16

This Comment focuses on exclusivity rights conferred by the patent system. The Hatch -Waxman Act and other
legislation provide non-patent exclusivity rights for certain new drug applicants. (See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355a, 21
U.S.C. §§ 360aa–ee, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), (j)(5)(F)(iii)– (iv), 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3) (E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii)).
17 For sake of simplicity, this Comment refers collectively to all companies that develop new drugs and file NDAs as
“brand-name companies.” In reality, many companies make both brand-name and generic drugs.
18 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2012 pp. 29.
19 Id.
20 Matthew Harper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Pharma to Change , FORBES (Aug. 1,
2013, 11:10 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventingnew-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/. Note that there are “[s]ome caveats, though: drug companies have
tax incentives to count costs in research and development, which could inflate the figure; they also are likely to
spend extra money in order to get those medicines approved in other countries. Even more important is the fact that
some R&D costs come from monitoring the safety of medicines after they become hits to monitor reports of side
effects.” Id.
21 Id.
22 Intellectual Property Protections are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry , PHRMA,
http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-property (last visited November 4, 2014) (“[O]nly two out of every 10
medicines will recoup the money spent on their development.”).
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the market; competition causes the price of a patented drug to plummet, and within a year of
generic entry, an average generic product “takes over ninety percent of the patent holder's unit
sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand product.”23
A successful, patent-protected drug is vital for innovators’ financial future and their ability
to reinvest in research endeavors. The purpose of the United States patent system—“[t]o promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive
right to their [inventions]”24 —is especially true for pharmaceutical innovations, as “new product
development in the pharmaceutical industry is more dependent on patent protection than in many
other industries.”25 One study shows that 60% of inventions within the pharmaceutical industr y
would not have been possible without the patent system. 26
Insofar as brand-name companies are dependent on the patent system to recover their R&D
investments, there are indications that the companies have gone too far. One strategy frequently
employed by brand-name companies is to obtain “secondary” patents, i.e., patents protecting
ancillary aspects of a drug other than its active ingredient. 27 These secondary patents essentially
extend the overall period of patent protection for a particular drug, but they vary in strength. In
fact, many secondary patents are considered “weak,” meaning that they are likely invalid or not
infringed. 28

The holder of a weak patent probably has no right to block the sale of cheaper

In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY:
HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010), at 8,
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay -delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumersbillions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf).
24 U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8.
25 Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (P HRMA) as Amicus Curiae In Support of
Respondents at 7, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) (citation omitted).
26 Id.
27 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 Sci. 1386, 1386 (2013).
28 Id.; see also Allison A. Schmitt, Note, Competition Ahead? The Legal Landscape for Reverse Payment
Settlements After Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 493, 503 (discussing that
brand-name companies lose most litigations on secondary patents).
23
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alternatives to its brand-name drug. 29 Thus, a settlement agreement that operates to exclude
competitors from the market is likely anticompetitive when it ends a dispute over a weak patent.
On the other hand, even if a settlement excludes competition, it can be deemed pro-competitive if
it allows generic entry before the expiration of the patent, especially if the patent is strong.30 In
fact, the Actavis Court conceded that settlements on terms of permitting the generic company to
enter the market before the expiration of the patent “would bring about competition . . . to the
consumer’s benefit.”31
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,32 “to strike a balance between two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to
research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring
cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”33 Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxma n
Act, the FDA required brand-name and generic companies alike to submit proof of drug safety and
efficacy through a New Drug Application (“NDA”).34 Brand-name companies were frustrated
with the time-consuming FDA approval process, because the longer the process took, the shorter

29

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013).
Id. at 2237.
31 Id. at 2234.
32 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
33 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Food And Drug Admin., 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting aaiPharma Inc. v.
Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments) (Aug. 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm.
34 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Barbara J. Williams, A Prescription for Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-Name Drug
Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
30
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the remainder of their patent life became, 35 and the more money they lost to generic competition. 36
Generic companies were also held back by the pre-Hatch-Waxman requirement to “re-prove” data
that had already been established by brand-name companies. 37

Furthermore, generic drug

companies could not perform any tests on a patented drug until after the relevant patent(s) expired,
because such use could be deemed an act of infringement.38 These impediments delayed generic
entry and prolonged consumers’ burden.
The Hatch-Waxman Act addressed these problems in various ways. First, it provided
patent term extension for patents covering a new drug product subject to FDA regulatory delays. 39
Second, the Act also freed generic manufacturers from patent infringement liability arising from
activities in connection with development of generic drugs.40 Third, it simplified the applicatio n
process for generic manufacturers by implementing Abbreviated New Drug Applicatio ns
(“ANDAs”).41
An ANDA obviates the need for generic companies to obtain all the necessary data from
scratch. It relies on the scientific findings of the corresponding NDA to demonstrate the safety

35

During the pre-Hatch-Waxman era, a patent term used to be greater of twenty years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States, or seventeen years from the patent grant. M ANUAL OF
PAT ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE , Ed. 9, § 270.
36 The FDA approval process often took place after patent acquisition. Williams, supra note 34, at 3 (citing Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study i, p. 4 (July 2002) (“[T]he effective
terms of many patents were shortened due to the time required for the FDA to ensure the safety and efficacy of the
brand-name company's drug product”)).
37 Williams, supra note 34, at 2 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984) (the House Report commenting on
the state of the law before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act that “with respect to drugs approved after 1962,
the FDA has adopted the view that generics must virtually duplicate the same health and safety tests conducted by
the original applicant for marketing approval”)).
38 See Roche Prod.. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860-861 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 856
(1984), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the
generic company’s use of the patented compound for commercial development p urposes was not infringement even
if it was necessary to obtain FDA approval.).
39 § 156(a), (f)(1)(A), and (f)(2)(A).
40 Id. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make use, offer for sale, or sell . . . a patented invention .
. . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”).
41 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j).
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and efficacy of a proposed generic drug as long as the generic company shows that its drug is
bioequivalent to the brand-name drug in the NDA.42 An NDA filer, a brand-name company, may
list any patents that it believes to cover its drug in the FDA’s compendium called Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange Book.”43
A generic manufacturer seeking FDA approval must include in its ANDA one of the following
certifications with respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book: no patent is listed in the Orange
Book (Paragraph I); the patent has expired (Paragraph II); the ANDA filer will not sell the
proposed generic drug until the Orange Book patent expires (Paragraph III); and the patent listed
in the Orange Book is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic
company’s proposed drug (Paragraph IV). 44 A generic applicant must notify the brand-name
company if its ANDA contains a Paragraph IV certification (“Paragraph IV ANDA”). 45 Upon
receipt of the notice, the brand-name company may do nothing, in which case the FDA may
authorize the generic company to market its proposed product.46 Alternatively, the brand-name
company may sue the generic manufacturer, because filing of a Paragraph IV ANDA itself is
considered a statutory act of patent infringement.47 If the brand-name company sues within fortyfive days of notice, the FDA may not grant final approval of the ANDA until the earlier of the
passage of thirty months or the issuance of a court decision that the patent is invalid or not
infringed.48 Thus, the mere filing of an infringement action can provide “additional years of a

42

Id.
§ 355(b)(1)(G). Eligible patents issued after the FDA approves an NDA may be listed in the Orange Book if the
manufacturer files the patent information within thirty days of issuance. § 355(c)(2).
44 § 355(j)(2)(A)(v ii).
45 § 355(j)(2)(B).
46 § 355(j)(5)(B).
47 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)–(2).
48 § 355(j)(5)(B).
43
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generic-free market, regardless of the merits of the lawsuit. ”49 One commentator observed that at
least twelve brand-name companies have actively used their secondary patents to trigger such
thirty-month stay of FDA approval.50
For the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer (“first- filer”), the Hatch-Waxman Act grants a 180day exclusivity period, during which other generic companies cannot compete in the market. 51
The drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act may have envisioned the exclusivity period as a reward
for the generic manufacturers who undertake the effort to invalidate weak patents.52 Ironically,
this well-intended incentive has turned into a “‘bounty’ worth hundreds of millions of dollars for
a major drug” due to its potential to keep the drug prices substantially high.53 Until 1998, the FDA
required the first-filers to win the patent infringement lawsuit to retain their exclusivity.54 Since
1998, however, the FDA relaxed the requirement to allow the first-filers to retain exclusivity so
long as they did not lose.55 This meant that settling a case did not affect the first-filer’s exclusivity
right even if the merits of the case remained unresolved.
From a brand-name company’s perspective, paying the first-filer to delay its market entry
makes economic sense. First, the first-filer’s victory leads to a substantial loss of profits especially
in a situation where the patent at issue is the only patent blocking competition.56 Outcomes of

49

Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to
Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market , 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 26–27 (2002).
50 Id. at 34.
51 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv ). If multiple applicants file on the same day, the FDA may designate more than one applicant as
a “first-filer.” U.S. DEPT . OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, T HE FOOD AND DRUG A DMINIST RATION, GUIDANCE
FOR INDUST RY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVIT Y W HEN M ULT IPLE ANDA S ARE SUBMIT TED ON T HE SAME DAY, at 5–6 (July
2003), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm072851.pdf.
52 Schmitt, supra note 28, at 499 (citing Brief for the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 25, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416)).
53 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006).
54 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 658.
55 Id.
56 Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives Delaying the Resolution
of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1800 (2011).
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patent infringement suits are notoriously unpredictable and error prone, with patents being
invalidated “more than 70 percent of the time.”57 “This means that the strongest of patents has a
substantial chance of losing after a trial and appeal, just as the weakest of patents has a substantia l
chance of winning.”58 Furthermore, brand-name companies have little to gain from their own
victory because it likely collects no damages and does not prevent other generic companies from
attempting to enter the market.59 Rather than putting their valuable patents in jeopardy and running
the risk of incurring losses, many brand-name companies prefer to settle by sharing their monopoly
profits with first-filers.
More significantly,

a settlement that delays a first-filer’s market entry creates a

“bottleneck” period during which a brand-name company is able to engage in supracompetitive
pricing of its drug. This is because a first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period begins to run only
when the first-filer begins marketing its generic product, or a court renders a judgment of patent
invalidity or non-infringement.60 Thus, subsequent ANDA filers cannot enter the market unless
one of them obtains a favorable court judgment against the brand-name company. Brand-name
companies avoid the risk of losing altogether by not suing subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers. 61
The ANDA filers have little incentive to initiate a declaratory judgment action,62 because even the
winner in such lawsuit must wait for the first-filer’s exclusivity period to run its course, at which
time other generics can enter the market and drive down the drug prices.

57

63

Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Competition Question Unasked In Actavis: What is the Scope of the Patent Right to
Exclude?, 28 A NT ITRUST ABA 45, 49 (2013).
58 Brief for the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416).
59 Herman, supra note 56, at 1800.
60 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 658.
61 Id.
62 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D) (A generic drug applicant may file a declaratory judgment action if the NDA holder
does not sue on all of the Orange Book listed patents within the forty -five-day period.).
63 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 658.
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Congress attempted to rectify the bottleneck problem by adding a forfeiture provision64 as
part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). 65
The provision causes a first-filer to lose its exclusivity period when it fails to market its proposed
drug by the “later of” the two conditions defined in subsections (aa) and (bb).66 Unfortunately, the
problem of bottleneck lingers after the MMA amendments because the new rule still allows firstfilers to retain their exclusivity by settling.67 Furthermore, while the new rule continues to allow
subsequent filers to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period by obtaining a court judgment, it now
requires that the judgment come from an appeals court.68 Thus, incentives for subsequent filers to
challenge patents are further diminished because even after expending their resources to win at the
appellate level, the 180-day exclusivity remains with the first-filer.69 No subsequent ANDA filer
is eligible for exclusivity upon the first-filer’s forfeiture.70
C. Actavis and Questions Left Unanswered

64

§ 355(j)(5)(D).
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of U.S. Code, including § 355).
66 The first condition under (aa) is “the earlier of” seventy-five days after the first filer's approval is made effective
and seventy-five days after thirty months after the ANDA filing. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa). The second condition
under (bb) is seventy-five days after: a court decision, from which no appeal has been taken or can be taken, that the
patent is invalid or not infringed; a settlement reaches a similar result; the patent information for the listed drug is
withdrawn by the NDA holder; or the first ANDA filer amends or withdraws the Paragraph IV certification. §
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb), (q)(1)(G); see also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 660–61.
67 According to the FDA, as long as there is a possibility that at least one of the conditions in subsection (bb) could
still occur, the first-filer would not forfeit its exclusivity. Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic
Drugs, Food & Drug Admin., to Marc A. Goshko, Exec. Dir., Teva N. Am. 5 (Jan. 17, 2008),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approv
alApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/UCM151237.pdf; see also Kurt R. Karst,
Academics Criticize the MMA’s Failure-to-Market Forfeiture Provisions as an Anemic Mechanism for Parked
Exclusivity and the MMA’s DJ Provisions as a Paper Tiger, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/04/academics-crit icize -the-mmas-failure-to-marketforfeiture-provisions-as-an-anemic-mechanism-for-park.html (discussing that the current statute does not counteract
the problem of exclusivity “parking” by first ANDA filers).
68 § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb); see also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 661 (“The post-MMA rules
make the relevant condition for defeasement an appeals court win, rather t han a district court win—a condition now
applicable to both post-MMA and pre-MMA drugs.”).
69 Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1586 (noting that settling with a first-filer “removes from
consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing competition”).
70 § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii); see also Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1583–84.
65
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i.

FTC v. Actavis, Inc.

Actavis revolved around agreements that a single brand-name company entered into with
three generic companies to settle Paragraph IV litigations. The agreements contained “roughly
similar promises,” requiring each generic company to not enter the relevant market until sixty- five
months before the brand-name company’s patent expired and to market the brand-name’s product
in return for the payment of “millions of dollars.”71 The FTC initiated an antitrust lawsuit against
all parties for “unlawfully agreeing ‘to share in [the brand-name company’s] monopoly profits,
abandon their patent challenges, and refrain from launching [cheaper generic drugs] for nine
years.’” 72

As mentioned above, the dilemma in antitrust cases involving reverse payment

settlement agreements stems from the unresolved issue of patent strength. The pre-Actavis courts
disagreed as to the antitrust standard for analyzing reverse payment settlements. Some circuits
applied the scope-of-the-patent test, under which a reverse payment settlement was immune from
antitrust scrutiny so long as the anticompetitive effects fell within the “exclusionary potential” of
the patent.73 Other courts employed the “quick-look” approach, which viewed reverse payment
settlements as prima facie evidence of illegality.74
The Actavis Court resolved the circuit split by holding that courts should employ the rule
of reason approach75 to strike a balance “between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent
monopoly and the illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.”76 In connection with
the rule of reason analysis, the Court suggested that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment
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FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
Id. at 2229–30.
73 See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
74 See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012).
75 The rule of reason analysis, in general, examines “whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Bd. of
Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
76 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
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can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness,”77 which in turn reveals “the payment's
objective [] to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee and the
challenger.”

78

The Court further stated that the size of a reverse payment may serve as “a strong

indicator of power” possessed by the patentee to bring about anticompetitive harm.

79

The Court

rejected the “scope-of-the-patent” analysis because “whether a particular restraint lies beyond the
limits of the patent monopoly is a conclusion … not its starting point.”80 The Court pointed out
that the “scope-of-the-patent” test overlooks the possibility of the patentee’s “serious doubts about
the patent’s survival” and objective of the payment “to maintain supracompetitive prices.”81 In
rejecting the “quick look” approach, the Court held that some reverse payments can be justified
under antitrust analysis.82
ii.

The Aftermath of Actavis

While Actavis resolved the circuit split, it left more questions than answers because the
Court left “to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation. ”83
One unresolved issue in the aftermath of Actavis is the precise definition of the term “payment. ”
There are currently various ways to settle Hatch-Waxman disputes other than what was at issue in
Actavis. For example, settlements can take the form of a licensing agreement without any money
exchanging hands where the brand-name company allows the generic manufacturer to use its
patent.84 Since the issuance of the Actavis opinion in June 2013, district court judges have already
disagreed on what constitutes “payment.” Some judges have held that Actavis decision applies to
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Id. at 2236–37.
Id. at 2238.
79 Id. at 2236.
80 Id. at 2236–37.
81 Id. at 2235, 2236–37.
82 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
83 Id. at 2238.
84 John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of Intellectual Property &
Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason , 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2006).
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monetary payments only, while others concluded that payment is not limited to monetary
payments.85 The FTC agrees with the latter view, noting that a brand-name company’s promise
not to develop or market its authorized generic86 (AG) is a form of payment.87
Furthermore, the Actavis Court did not define what constitutes a “large” payment. The
Court only suggested that “strong evidence” of anticompetitive activity may be found when the
amount of payment is larger than what the generic would gain in profits if it won the Paragraph IV
litigation and entered the market.88 At the same time, the Court cautioned that a finding of large
reverse payment alone is insufficient to conclude illegality, because certain reverse payments can
have lawful explanations, such as the cost of anticipated litigation, payments for valuable services
promised to be rendered by the generic company, and “any other convincing justification.”89
Yet another uncertainty arising from Actavis is when and how the question of patent
validity and/or infringement should be considered. According to the Court, “it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question,”90 and the legal community is
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Compare, e.g., In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 12-CV-995 WHW, 2014 WL 282755, at *6–7
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court considered a reverse payment to involve an exchange of money” and
therefore did “not extend the holding of Actavis to the non-monetary facts before it.”), and In re Loestrin 24 FE
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472-S-PAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123322, at *34 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Reading
Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to monetary settlements”), with In re Lipitor Antitrust
Litig., No. 12-CV-02389, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127877, at *62 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (In applying Actavis here,
the non-monetary payment must be converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary value . . . .), In re Niaspan
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124818, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (“‘[R]everse
payment’ is not limited to a cash payment.”), and In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02409,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126954, at *75 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2014) (“[U]nlawful reverse payments are not limited to
monetary payments.”).
86 An AG is a generic drug produced by the same brand-name company that issues the corresponding brand-name
drug. Brand-name companies can market AGs even during the first-filer’s exclusivity period. See, e.g., Alix
McKenna, FTC Report Shows Increase in Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements, REDBLOG (June 11, 2013)
http://www.regblog.org/2013/06/11/ 11-mckenna-ftc-report/.
87 Brief of Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs -Appellants, on appeal from In re Lamictal
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-995, 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (No. 14-1243) (urging
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to reverse the district court’s determination that a brand -name
company’s commitment not to introduce an authorized generic in exchange for a generic company’s promise to drop
a challenge to the patent was not a “reverse-payment” under Actavis.).
88 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1581).
89 Id. at 2237.
90 Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
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largely in agreement that the Actavis Court did not wish to disregard the merits of a settled case
entirely.91 A challenge lies in defining the conditions under which the issue of patent validity and
infringement must be addressed. Furthermore, in cases where the merits of underlying litiga tio n
may not be considered, it is questionable whether antitrust principles alone are sufficient to assess
the anticompetitive effects of Paragraph IV settlements.

As one commentator points out, “the

problem is that the ultimate competitive impact of a pharmaceutical patent settlement is really
dependent on the merits of the underlying patent litigation . . . .”92
III.

Details of the Proposed Judicial Approval Procedure

Bearing in mind the intricate interrelationship among the Hatch-Waxman Act, antitrust
laws, and the public interests, this Comment proposes a judicial approval procedure (“proposed
procedure” or “proposed settlement procedure”) that alleviates many of the problems associated
with settling Paragraph IV litigations.

93

The procedure mirrors the framework of Rule 23(e) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 94 which requires judicial approval of any “settlement,
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See, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-CV-2141, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102958, at *15 (E.D. Pa. July 29,
2014) (“[I]n my view, the use of the word ‘normally’ reflects the Court's expression that under certain discrete
circumstances there could be situations where the validity of the patent should be litigated within a reverse payment
antitrust trial.”); Lars P. Taavola, The 30th Anniversary of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Jumping into the Actavis Briar
Patch–Insight into How Courts May Structure Reverse Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions that
Actavis Left Unanswered, 40 W M. M IT CHELL L. REV. 1370, 1406 (2014) (“[T]he rule-of-reason approach may
encourage the parties, at least in part, to argue the merits of the underlying case.”). See also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at
2238 (The Court cautions against “the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the
other, consideration of every possible fact or theory.”).
92 Kevin McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, 28 A NT ITRUST ABA 36,
38 (2013) (quoting Thomas B. Leary, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of
Pharmaceuticals Patent Disputes, Part ll at n.27, Address Before the American Bar Association Healthcare Program
(May 17, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.shtm.).
93 The proposed procedure focuses on the settlements of actions that were initiated within forty-five days of
Paragraph IV notice. However, the same model may apply to settlements of other types of actions based on
Paragraph IV certifications. For example, brand-name companies may strategically choose to initiate a lawsuit
based on Paragraph IV filings after the expiration of forty-five days or wait for the Paragraph IV filer to file a
declaratory judgment action against them. The same anticompetitive conc erns discussed in this Comment would
apply to settlements of such actions, because they can involve a payment, delayed generic entry, and retention of the
180-day exclusivity period.
94 At least one commentator has casually suggested using Rule 23(e) settlement procedure as a model to settle
Paragraph IV litigations, but without exploring the topic in detail. See Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note
14, at 640.
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voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class” in a class
action.95
Perhaps the initial reaction to adopting Rule 23(e) may be that Paragraph IV litigations are
not class actions. When parties to a Paragraph IV litigation settle, non-parties (e.g., members of
the public) will not be legally bound by the settlement terms in the same way class members would
be bound in a class action settlement. However, common law sometimes calls for judicial review
and approval, particularly if a settlement “affects the rights of non-parties or non-settling parties,
or where the settlement is executed by a party acting in a representative capacity.”96 The HatchWaxman lawsuits satisfy both criteria.

First, the Hatch-Waxman procedural framework is

“intended to benefit parties beyond those named in the action.”97 The outcome of a Paragraph IV
litigation affects accessibility of drugs for patients who have the right to healthcare 98 but are nonparties to the action. It also influences drug availability to the public in the future, because a bad
patent often causes other companies to forgo R&D in the field it improperly covers.99 Reduced
participation in R&D hampers innovation and results in fewer treatment options for patients.
Second, Paragraph IV filers act in place of the public by virtue of challenging unwarranted
patents. 100 In case of Paragraph IV litigations involving weak patents, it is overwhelmingly
procompetitive and beneficial to the public when a Paragraph IV filer prevails. But the interests
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
M ANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIT IGATION (Fourth) § 13.14 at 172 (2004) [hereinafter “M ANUAL”].
97 David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch -Waxman Patent
Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1338 (June 2010).
98 See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. H12,623, H12,848 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (“[T]his bill will do for America what we
should have done 100 years ago: provide health care for all Americans as a matter of right, not as a matter of
privilege.”) (statement of Rep. Braley); 155 Cong. Rec. H12,598, H12,619 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (“Every
American deserves the promise of quality affordable health care, and this is our moment to fulfill that promise.”)
(statement of Rep. Langevin). This Comment refrains from discussing the issue of whether illegal immigrants have
the right to healthcare.
99 FED. TRADE COMM ’N, TO PROMOT E INNOVAT ION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY, at 5 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balancecompetition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
100 Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1338.
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of Paragraph IV filers and the public do not exactly align, because victory in litigation is not
necessarily the ultimate goal of Paragraph IV filers.101 When a Paragraph IV filer prevails in
litigation and enters the market, it is often true that “the total profits of the patent holder and the
generic manufacturer on the drug in the competitive market will be lower than the total profits of
the patent holder alone under a patent-conferred monopoly.”102 Therefore, it makes economic
sense for a Paragraph IV filer to settle by delaying its market entry and reap the benefit of the
resulting monopoly as long as the value of the filer’s share exceeds the anticipated gain from
litigious victory. A Paragraph IV filer no longer acts in a representative capacity when it settles
an action involving a weak patent, because the public is denied access to generic drugs.
Today, patients who are on at least one prescription drug make up anywhere from 50% to
70% of the population.103 The FTC estimates that pay for delay settlements add $35 billion to
consumers’ out-of-pocket expenses and $12 billion or more to the federal government over a ten
year period.104 In 2013, 21% of adults in the United States discontinued or skipped prescription
doses because of high cost.105 Considering the profound impact of pharmaceutical litigations on
public health, members of the public affected by Paragraph IV litigations are analogous to class
members in class action lawsuits.
The requirement of judicial approval is not a new concept. The Federal Rule of Civil
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Robert E. Colletti, The Role of the Food and Drug Attorney in Hatch-Waxman Lawsuits, Food and Drug
Settlements and Negotiations, in Inside the Minds: Food and Drug Settlements and Negotiations (2006) (discussing
various ways in which generic companies benefit from filing an ANDA regardless of first -to-file status).
102 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006).
103 Qiuping Gu et al., Prescription Drug Use Continues to Increase: U.S. Prescription Drug Data for 2007 -2008,
NCHS Data Brief No. 42, at 6 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf; Wenjun Zhong, et al., Age
and Sex Patterns of Drug Prescribing in a Defined American Population , 88 M AYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 7,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013.04.021.
104 Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Center for American Progress, “Pay-for-Delay”
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Antico mpetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’
Wallets, and Help Pay for Healthcare Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) (June 23, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/pay -delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industryhow-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
105 Paris, supra note 5 (citing 2013 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey).
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Procedure 23.1(c) requires a directive similar to Rule 23(e) approval process to “settle[ ],
voluntarily dismiss[], or compromise[]” a shareholder derivative action. 106 Another example is
New York State’s Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, which requires a judicial approval proceeding
before a charitable corporation can dispose of its assets. 107 With the state attorney general serving
as a statutory party to the proceeding, the purpose of the New York statute is to “ensure that the
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation, the public, are adequately represented and
protected from improvident transactions.”108 Some may argue that a judicial approval requireme nt
undermines the general policy favoring settlements of expensive and time-consuming patent
litigations. The Supreme Court, however, cautioned against acceding to such practical concerns
when there is “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.” 109

Within the Hatch-

Waxman regime, the public interest to balance innovation and competition far outweighs the need
to settle in private.
The following subsections describe the proposed procedure which consists of two phases.
Subsection A discusses the initial evaluation phase. Subsection B describes the formal hearing
phase that enables members of the public to object to questionable settlement agreements.
Subsection C provides additional remarks regarding the proposed procedure.
A. Initial Evaluation of a Proposed Paragraph IV Settlement
i.

The Requirements for Settling Parties

Under Rule 23(e), parties who agree to settle must “disclose all terms of the [proposed]
settlement or compromise” to the court presiding over the class action. 110 The settling parties bear
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c).
N.Y. NOT -FOR-PROFIT CORP . LAW § 511 (McKinney 2014).
108 Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1999).
109 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013).
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2.
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the burden of persuading the court that settlement is preferable to litigation by showing that the
settlement terms are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”111 The parties must also submit to the court
“a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal,”112 including any
undertakings “that, although seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms of the settlement
by trading away possible advantages for the class in return for advantages for others.”113 The
disclosure may be supplemented by briefs, motions, or informal presentations by the settling
parties.114
Similarly, the proposed procedure requires parties to a Paragraph IV litigation to submit
their proposed settlement agreement to the court in which their case is pending. The settling parties
bear the burden of persuading the court that their agreement is not unreasonably anticompetitive.
The submitted agreement may be in the form of a summary in lieu of a copy of the actual agreement
as long as it sufficiently describes all material terms. The parties should also be required to disclose
any agreement or undertakings that, “although seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms
of the settlement”115 by trading away potential benefits to the public. Such disclosure includes
other settlements and pending actions involving the same parties. “Doubts should be resolved in
favor of identification.”116

Rule 23(e)(3) does not specify sanctions for failure to identify an

agreement or an undertaking connected with the settlement, 117 but the Federal Judicial Center
suggests to reopen the approved settlement if the unidentified materials bear significantly on the

111

M ANUAL, § 21.631, at 318.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2.
114 M ANUAL , § 21.632, at 320–21.
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2.
116 Id.
117 M ANUAL , § 21.631, at 320.
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settlement’s reasonableness.118 The proposed procedure should simulate this sanction by voiding
the presumptive legality of an approved agreement as described below.119
ii.

The Court’s Role

The judicial role under Rule 23(e) is limited to approving, disapproving, or imposing
conditions on a proposed settlement. 120

In conducting a preliminary review of a class action

settlement, the court must “adopt the role of a skeptical client and critically examine” the terms of
the proposed settlement. 121

This aspect is crucial, because once parties agree to settle, the

adversarial nature of litigation is lost. Some circuit courts have even stated that “the district court
acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.”122 The
court has discretion to direct the settling parties to submit additional materials in order to fully
consider the proposed settlement. The requested information may include any factors indicating
the value of the settlement, e.g., the cost of litigation or the total present value of monetary and
nonmonetary terms.123 The settling parties are given an opportunity to claim the protection of
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality. 124
Similar to the Rule 23(e) procedure, the court’s role in the proposed procedure should be
limited to approving, disapproving, or imposing conditions on a proposed settlement.

The

presiding judge may not draft nor rewrite an agreement, though he or she may make suggestio ns.
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Id.
See infra Part III.A.iv.
120 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The settlement must stand or fall in its
entirety.”); but cf. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00-CV-0648, 2001 WL 170792, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2001) (conditioning approval of a settlement on parties’ adopting changes specified by the district court).
121 John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST .
U. L. REV. 865, 889 (2012).
122 Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).
123 M ANUAL , § 21.631, at 320. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, note to
Subdivision (h) (“Settlements involving nonmonetary provisions for class members also deserve careful s crutiny to
ensure that these provisions have actual value to the class”).
124 M ANUAL , § 21.631, at 319.
119
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The court must play the “role of a skeptical client and critically examine”

125

the proposed

agreement for its potentially anticompetitive effects. The court may, at its discretion, direct the
parties to submit additional information or briefs which “the court considers relevant to its review
of a proposed settlement,”126 but it must provide an opportunity for the settling parties to claim
work-product or other confidentiality. In order to create a record for appellate review, the court
should consider and record all materials submitted to the court.
Rule 23(e) further authorizes the court to appoint a magistrate judge, guardian ad litem,
special master, court-appointed expert, or technical advisor who assists in reviewing the terms of
a proposed settlement terms, studying how those terms affect the absent class members, and
determining their fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy. 127 A court-appointed expert provides a
neutral assessment and testimony regarding the valuation of the settlement or of its legality. 128 The
judge must determine whether such testimony will “assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue.”129
In the proposed procedure, the court must appoint at least one expert advisor who would
assist the court in identifying as well as examining any issues concerning the agreement terms.
This is important to ensure the quality of review given the complexities of the Hatch-Waxman
system and antitrust analysis. Furthermore, as discussed in more details below,130 an appointed
expert is instrumental in facilitating the judicial review as expeditiously as possible.
iii.

The Court’s Preliminary Review of a Proposed Agreement
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Lopatka, supra note 121, at 889.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2.
127 M ANUAL , § 21.632, at 321 & § 21.644, at 329.
128 Id. § 21.632 at 321.
129 FED. R. EVID. 702; see also M ANUAL , § 21.632, at 321.
130 See discussion infra Part III.C.Error! Reference source not found..
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Rule 23(e) requires the court to preliminarily review a proposed settlement agreement and
order a formal hearing (commonly known as a “fairness hearing”) only if the court is satisfied with
the “fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy” of the settlement terms. 131 The court also makes a
preliminary determination that the proposed class satisfies the statutory criteria. 132 The judge may
make these determinations with or without a preliminary hearing 133 and seek an independent
review of provisions that call for closer scrutiny. 134 The settling parties have an opportunity to
amend their agreement to overcome the court’s objections. 135
In class actions, factors that may be considered by the judge in evaluating a proposed
settlement agreement vary depending on the nature of the suit being settled. 136 Some general
factors include but are not limited to: advantages of the proposed settlement as opposed to
proceeding with the litigation in light of the merits of the claims;137 whether any attorneys’ fees
claimed as part of the settlement are reasonable;138 the maturity of the underlying substantive
issues; 139 the extent of participation in the settlement negotiations by class members or their
representatives, a judge, a magistrate judge, or a special master;140 the effect of the settlement on
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M ANUAL, § 21.632, at 321; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
Id. § 21.632, at 321.
133 Id. § 21.632, at 320–21.
134 Examples of questionable provisions include “unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or segments
of the class, inadequate compensation or harms to the classes, the need for subclasses, or excessive compensa tion for
attorneys.” Id. § 21.632, at 321.
135 Id. § 21.632, at 321.
136 Id. § 21.62, at 315.
137 M ANUAL , § 21.62, at 316.
138 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 3
(“Whether or not there are formal objections, the court must determine whether a fee award is justified and, if so, set
a reasonable fee.”); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have repeatedly
held that a district court abuses its discretion if it approves a class action settlement without determining that any
attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are reasonable and that the settlement itself is reasonable in light of
those fees.”).
139 M ANUAL , § 21.62, at 316.
140 Id.
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other pending actions;141 what other courts have done with similar settlements;142 the amount of a
monetary relief provided for class members;143 and the value of non-monetary relief.144
Similarly, a court undertaking the proposed procedure may evaluate the parties’ agreement
with or without a preliminary hearing. However, the proposed procedure diverges from Rule 23
by authorizing the court to issue a final approval in specified circumstances. This can be achieved
through a two-prong analysis, with the first prong comprising a categorical test and the second
involving the rule of reason analysis. Under the first prong, the court utilizes certain pre-defined
factors to decide whether to order a formal hearing.145 Since the burden of persuasion lies with
the settling parties, they must submit any requisite calculations and analysis to the court, and the
court’s advisor may assist the judge in evaluating their work. With the development of case law
in the area, this prong will evolve into a streamlined process.
If the triggering factors are not found in the first prong, the court should conduct the rule
of reason analysis which has been employed in various antitrust cases to interpret the federal
Sherman Act146 and state antitrust laws.147 The court must balance anticompetitive harms and
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Id.
Id. at 317.
143 Id.
144 In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1998).
145 For example, the court may set the threshold “Settlement Competition Index (SCI)” beyond which a formal
hearing must be ordered. Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1328–48. If a proposed agreement’s SCI falls below a
threshold value and thereby fails to trigger a formal hearing order, the court may proceed to the second prong.
Alternatively, a certain amount of valuable consideration from the patentee may be a triggering factor. For instance,
the amount of considerations may be calculated using the method proposed in Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert
Hovenkamp, & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 A NT ITRUST 16, 18 (2013). Following this method, if the
“otherwise unexplained” portion of the patentee’s payment exceeds a predetermined limit, a formal hearing may be
ordered.
146 E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (The rule of reason is the accepted
standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act]); Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust
plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive
before it will be found unlawful.”); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400–01 (1948) (“We
apply the ‘rule of reason’ of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, to efforts to monopolize through patents
as well as in non-patent fields.”).
147 Molly Wilcox and Jason Yan, Antitrust Violations, 51 A M. CRIM. L. REV. 837, 869 (discussing that many state
laws track the Sherman Act).
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procompetitive benefits to determine whether the proposed agreement as a whole would
unreasonably restrict competition in the relevant market. 148 If the court determines that the
proposed agreement raises antitrust concerns, it must order a formal hearing.
Because the case being settled is a patent infringement action and thus is not bound by the
Actavis decision, the court may freely consider the merits of the case in applying the rule of reason
analysis. This aspect is particularly significant because “the likelihood that the patent will be held
invalid or not infringed is key to evaluating whether a settlement violates antitrust law.”149 It
would be necessary to take into account the maturity of the underlying patent issue and “the
probable outcome of a trial on the merits.”150 Additional factors that the court should consider
include, in no specific order: the proposed market entry date of the generic;151 whether there are
other companies that settled with respect to the same drug at issue;152 whether there are other
agreements entered into by the same settling parties; 153 any other potentially anticompetitive
provisions (e.g., no AG provision154 ); the extent of antitrust injury to drug purchasers (e.g., the
extent of overcharge155 ); the brand-name company’s market power in a defined market;156 the
value of net considerations flowing from the brand-name company to the generic company;157 and
how other courts have treated similar settlements in the past. 158 With respect to the last factor,

148

Id.at 840.
Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1336. See also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
150 M ANUAL , § 21.62, at 316.
151 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
152 See discussion infra Parts IV.A.–B .
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certain forms of settlement may be considered a “safe-harbor.” For instance, the Supreme Court
stated in Actavis that parties “may, as in other industries, settle . . . by allowing the generic
manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee
paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”159
iv.

Parties’ Options After Having Their Agreement Approved or Disapproved
Without a Formal Hearing

Under Rule 23, if the court finally approves a proposed settlement, an order of approval
should include the court’s findings and reasonings.160 An approved agreement is presumed legal,
and both the court and the parties must abide by the approved settlement terms.161 If the court’s
decision is appealed, the decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 162 “An abuse
of discretion may be found where the ‘district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.’” 163
However, “[w]hether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be reviewed
de novo.”164
If the court in the proposed procedure concludes after the two-prong analysis that the
proposed agreement does not violate the antitrust laws, it may issue an official approval along with
a detailed explanation of the court’s findings and reasons for its decision. The settling parties must
submit the approved agreement to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the United States
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FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
M ANUAL, § 13.14, at 172.
161 Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2011).
162 See, e.g., In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., Nos. 12-3456, 12-3457, 12-4629, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
18544, at *10 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We review a district court's decision to . . . approve a settlement u nder the abuse of
discretion standard”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e review the determination of the
district court [with respect to the approved settlement] only for an abuse of discretion ”).
163 In re Nutella, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *10 (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d
Cir. 1995))).
164 In re Nutella, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *10 (quoting Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank , 726 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012))).
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Department of Justice pursuant to the current regulation. 165

Similar to Rule 23, a judicially

approved agreement is presumptively legal, and the FTC must appeal instead of initiating an
antitrust suit if it wishes to challenge the decision. The appellate court may review the district
court’s decision only under the abuse of discretion standard. The presumptive legality may be
void, however, if the settling parties failed to disclose an undertaking in connection with the
agreement prior to the approval, either deliberately or inadvertently.
If the judge determines that a formal hearing is required, the settling parties may choose to
(1) move forward with the hearing; (2) amend the proposed agreement to remove any obstacles to
court approval within a specified time limit; (3) continue to litigate; or (4) dismiss the case under
the condition that the plaintiff would not sue the defendant based on the product proposed in the
ANDA. If an amendment does not result in court approval, the parties must proceed with the
formal hearing or continue to litigate. The parties may not appeal at this time.
B. Formal Hearing
i.

The Court’s Notice to the FTC and the Public

Under Rule 23, the court must alert all class members to their opportunity to present their
views and hear arguments regarding the settlement terms. 166 For members who wish to object to
the settlement, the notice instructs them to file written statements of their objections within a
specified time and to notify the court if they also intend to appear at the fairness hearing. 167 Class
counsel—attorneys representing a class—must communicate any proposed settlement terms to
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class representatives 168 and ultimately to all class members. 169

Class counsel may convey

information to class members in a variety of ways, for example by holding a meeting (especially
if the class is small), or by creating a toll-free telephone number or a website to provide settlement
details and court-approved answers to frequently-asked questions.170 An objector who testifies at
the hearing may be “any class member who does not opt out” or any party to the settlement, such
as “a shareholder of a corporation involved in the settlement.”171
In the proposed procedure, the court should notify the FTC and members of the public
before holding a formal hearing.

The notice should also include descriptions of the proposed

agreement, and instructions on how to file their objections within a specified time and on how to
notify the court if they also intend to appear at the formal hearing. The notice need not include a
complete copy of the agreement so long as it sufficiently describes all material terms of the
proposed settlement. Public objectors may include wholesalers, retailers, insurance companies,
and consumers, regardless of their potential status as direct or indirect purchasers. 172 Those who
fail to object during the specified time—including the FTC—forfeit their right to object, appeal or
initiate an antitrust action on the basis of the approved agreement.
The court may instruct to provide notices in publications such as the Federal Register,
magazines, newspapers, and trade journals. 173

It may also be appropriate to post notices on

A class representative is “a person named in the complaint as the plaintiff and who has been determined by the
court to be a legally "adequate" person to represent the interests of the class.” The Federal Class Action Practice
Manual, Glossary of Legal Terms Used in Class Action Litigation, CLASS A CT ION LIT IGATION INFORMATION (last
visited on Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/glossary.html.
169 M ANUAL , § 21.641, at 323.
170 Id. § 21.641, at 323–24.
171 Id. § 21.643, at 326.
172 The proposed procedure might raise an issue of standing with respect to objectors. This Comment proposes that
any member of the public should be able to object, but if necessary, the proposed procedure may impose specific
standing requirements.
173 See, e.g., M ANUAL , § 21.311, at 287–88 (discussing various methods of distributing certification notices to
unidentifiable class members after a reasonable effort).
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websites or public places likely to be frequented by potential objectors. 174 The settling parties may
initially bear the cost of preparing and distributing the notice and later share it with objectors in
agreed-upon proportions. The court may appoint a public counsel similar to a class counsel who
would be responsible for overseeing the notificatio n procedure, communicating and coordinating
with the objectors to consolidate similar arguments. If no objection is raised within the specified
time period, the court must still hold a hearing with its advisor(s) playing the role of an adversary
to the settling parties.
ii.

The Burden-Shifting Approach

In class action settlements, a court may approve a settlement only if it is “fair, reasonable,
and adequate.”175 At a Rule 23 fairness hearing, settling parties may “present witnesses, experts,
and affidavits or declarations.” Objectors may also testify. 176 Objectors may act individually or
on behalf of class members.177 The court may set time limits on objectors’ arguments and refuse
to hear the same objections more than once. 178 If objections are to be withdrawn, the court must
approve the withdrawal.179 If withdrawn objections result in modifications to the settlement terms,
the withdrawal is considered as part of the settlement. 180

Even in the absence or scarcity of

objections, the judge must still consider diverse interests of the class and requisite factors before
reaching her decision as to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement. 181 Class
counsels must protect the interests of the entire class regardless of the position taken by objectors
or class representatives.

182

The court may grant additional discovery if it is necessary for the
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177 Id. § 21.643, at 327.
178 Id. § 21.634, at 322.
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objectors to demonstrate the inadequacy of the settlement. 183

However, the discovery should be

limited and conditioned on a showing of need. 184 The court must also ensure that there is sufficie nt
record of the basis and justification for the court’s conclusion. 185

The court must explain the

findings in writing in sufficient detail to class members and the appellate court. 186
At a formal hearing in the proposed procedure, the court may employ a burden-shifting
approach in applying the rule of reason analysis:187 the objectors must first demonstrate likely
anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement in a well-defined antitrust market; if the
objectors are successful, the settling parties must offer a pro-competitive justification(s); if the
settling parties are successful, the objectors must show that the settling parties’ justification(s) can
be achieved through materially less restrictive alternatives; if the objectors are successful, the court
must weigh the overall anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to determine whether the
settlement agreement is reasonable.

The court should follow the general practice of Rule 23

regarding limited discovery, witnesses, experts, affidavits or declarations and withdrawal. The
court must approve withdrawal of any objector, 188 and if withdrawn objections result in
modifications to the settlement terms, the withdrawal is considered as part of the settlement.
iii.

Parties’ Options After the Formal Hearing

If the court approves an agreement in the proposed procedure, the parties to the agreement
may begin acting immediately in accordance with the agreement. Only those who timely objected
may appeal the decision. The agreement will be reviewed under a deferential standard, i.e., the
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abuse of discretion standard as described above. A de novo review is proper only in limited
circumstances such as the parties’ failure to disclose pertinent side agreements or a clearly
erroneous application of law. Even if the approved agreement is ultimately found unlawful, the
settled parties cannot be held liable in future antitrust suits or penalized for their actions during the
appeal period in accordance with the agreement.
If the judge disapproves the agreement after the formal hearing, the settling parties may (1)
continue to litigate the patent infringement case; (2) amend the agreement within a specified time
only to the extent that it removes or corrects the anticompetitive aspect(s) of the agreement; (3)
appeal within a specified period; or (4) dismiss the case under the condition that the plaintiff would
not sue the defendant based on the product proposed in its ANDA. The amended agreement of
option (2) would not be subject to a formal hearing, and if it does not result in an approval, the
parties must (1) litigate, (3) appeal, or (4) dismiss. If the proposed agreement is rejected on appeal,
the parties may not attempt to settle or amend again. The parties must choose between options (1)
and (4).
C. Additional Requirements of the Proposed Settlement Process
i.

A Strict Timeline to Avoid Delaying the Settlement Process

Bona fide objectors in class actions can be beneficial as they assist the court in identifying
areas of a settlement that need improvement. 189

On the other hand, objections delay final

resolution of a settlement by requiring the court to consider their arguments. 190 This “holdup”
becomes more severe when objectors appeal, which can take years. 191 Appeals are costly to class
counsel as well as to non-objecting class members because they are typically not entitled to
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payment “until the legal process has run its course.”192 In contrast, objectors incur relatively low
cost because their pay is not dependent on settlement approval, and they are able to minimize
appellate litigation fees by recycling widely applicable principles on which to base their
objections.193 Furthermore, an objector has an occasional incentive of winning attorney fees if it
succeeds in making changes to the settlement in a way that benefits the class.194 The prospect of
delay and financial loss has prompted many class counsels to pay objectors out of their own
pockets to withdraw the appeals.195 This dynamic has given rise to a lawyer-driven phenomenon
called “objector blackmail” by which class members extract a payoff from class counsel by
threatening to file meritless appeals.196 Attorneys who routinely seek out class actions and object
on behalf of class members are called “professional objectors,”197 of whom “[f]ederal courts are
increasingly weary.”198
Paragraph IV litigations are different from class actions in this regard, because monetary
awards are typically not involved, 199 and attorneys for both sides are paid by their clients.
Moreover, a settlement holdup would be desirable for both litigants in the Hatch-Waxman regime.
If the proposed settlement procedure can be dragged out as long as possible, the brand-name
company benefits from maintaining its status quo during that time—i.e., the ability to charge
monopoly prices—even if the proposed settlement ends up being rejected in the end. The
defendant generic company might play along if it believes the later payout would outweigh the
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overall cost.

Furthermore, when a brand-name company owns multiple patents of varying

strengths covering a single drug, both the brand-name and generic companies would likely benefit
from prolonging the settlement procedure. For example, one commentator has pointed out a
situation where a generic company prevails in a Paragraph IV litigation involving a weak patent
but there remains a strong patent covering the same drug as the weak one. 200 Because the strong
patent continues to block competition, the prevailing generic company is effectively barred from
marketing its generic product until the expiration of the strong patent’s term. If the generic
company is a first-filer, its victory that happens too early would result in a premature period of
exclusivity that would expire pursuant to the forfeiture provision. 201 It would not be feasible to
wait to file an ANDA against the weak patent until the strong patent is about to expire, because
winning the first-filer status is a race against other generic companies. For these reasons, generic
first-filers have begun to request a stay of the Paragraph IV litigatio n for the weak patent until
closer to the expiration date of the strong patent. 202 A stay followed by a generic victory would
allow the first-filing generic to retain its 180-day exclusivity period and to create a bottleneck even
after the strong patent expires. This “stay” scheme also benefits the brand-name company, because
the exclusivity period running beyond the expiry date of the last standing patent works to prevent
full competition.
The proposed procedure should not serve as a substitute for a stay, 203 and thus, it is

200
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imperative to keep the proposed procedure on a strict timeline.

Only in extraordinar y

circumstances should courts grant a request to extend any deadline. The aforementioned twoprong test204 and appointment of an expert advisor205 are intended to facilitate a timely completion
of the court’s analysis.

Additional tactics can be implemented to ensure expediency of the

proposed approval process, such as requiring the settling parties to make their submissions as
concise as possible, creating a template for the court’s opinion, and expediting the appeal process.
The court should also have the power to terminate a settlement procedure if it finds that settling
parties are not negotiating in good faith or to impose sanctions on a frivolous objector.
Furthermore, settling parties must be prohibited from giving, lending, or promising valuable
consideration to or for any person, to induce another to object or appeal in the proposed procedure.
Finally, objectors should be required to disclose their sponsors or any inducements they received
during a relevant time period. The inducements could come from not only the settling parties, but
also other generic companies interested in the relevant market. The court should be cognizant of
the financial relationships among objectors and settling parties when considering their arguments.
ii.

Two Conditions Imposed on the Settling Parties

In order to encourage settling parties to negotiate in good faith, two conditions are imposed
on them once they express their intent to settle: (1) the plaintiff may dismiss the case only under
the condition that it would not preclude the sale of the product proposed in the defendant’s ANDA
on the basis of the patent at issue; and (2) the defendant may not convert its Paragraph IV
certification to Paragraph III certification.

204
205

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See discussion regarding expert advisor supra Part III.A.ii.
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The first condition ensures that the plaintiff brand-name company utilizes the proposed
procedure in good faith.
Paragraph IV actions.

As discussed above, 206 brand-name companies benefit from staying
They could abuse the system by filing a Paragraph IV suit with little

prospect of winning, deliberately dragging out the lawsuit until the end of the thirty-month stay,
initiating the settlement approval process, and finally dismissing the action. The current statutory
provision, 21 U.S.C. § 355, discourages such tactic by giving the judge a statutory discretion to
shorten the thirty- month stay period when “either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate
in expediting the action.”207 But its deterrent effects are moderate, because even if the thirtymonth stay is lifted, the patent at issue is still in force. A future lawsuit remains a possibility for
the defendant if it launches its generic product at risk. If the generic company subsequently files
a declaratory action, the legal proceeding would prolong the period during which the public is
deprived of generic drugs. In a class action, a court approval is required before any voluntar y
dismissal. 208

The purpose of this requirement is to protect the interest of non-party class

members.209 Similarly, the proposed settlement procedure should take into account the interests
of those in need of generic drugs. Thus, the first condition eliminates uncertainty as to the legal
status of the proposed ANDA product upon voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff and allows the
generic company to enter the market sooner.
The second condition ensures that the defendant generic company negotiates in good faith.
Since the risks associated with Paragraph IV challenges are small, a generic company might file a
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Paragraph IV ANDA against a strong patent to induce the brand-name patent holder to sue and see
how the settlement negotiation plays out. If the defendant finds itself in an unfavorable position,
it can back out by converting its ANDA certification from Paragraph IV to III, which attests that
the generic company would refrain from selling the proposed product until the patent at issue
expires.210 This would result in dismissal of the action.211 Not only is such practice a waste of
judicial resources, but it also exacerbates the power imbalance 212 between the parties. Therefore,
the second condition fosters bona fide challenges to brand name patents.
IV.

The Advantages of the Proposed Judicial Approval Procedure

The following Subsections A through E will highlight certain aspects of the proposed
procedure and discuss how they address the prevailing problems surrounding the current HatchWaxman settlements.
A. The Proposed Procedure Informs the Public and Allows Third Parties to Intervene
Before Antitrust Injury Occurs
The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to “assure that any person whose rights would be affected by
a dismissal or compromise has the opportunity to contest the proposed action.”213 Paragraph IV
settlements affect people’s right to healthcare, 214 yet not every injured person is entitled to
recovery even when the federal and state statutes provide private causes of action for those who
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§ 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii).
There has been at least one instance where the defendant’s conversion of its ANDA certification has resulted in a
court dismissal. See United Therapeutics Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121573 (D.N.J. Aug. 29,
2014) (“Plaintiff's complaints also included allegations that [defendant] Sandoz would infringe [the ‘222] patent
listed in the [Orange Book] . . . . On April 9, 2014, Sandoz converted its paragraph IV certification regarding the
'222 patent to a paragraph III certification. On June 2, 2014, in accordance with that decision, the Court dismissed
the counts in [plaintiff’s] Complaints alleging infringement of the '222 patent without prejudice, along with Sandoz's
counterclaims for non-infringement and invalidity of the '222 patent.”)
212 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
213 Pearson v. Skydell, 522 F.2d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing denied 525 F.2d 1407, certiorari denied 425
U.S. 912 (internal citation omitted); see also Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The purpose of requiring Court approval of a ‘dismissal’ or ‘compromise’ of a class action is to
protect the interests of non-party class members.”).
214 See supra note 98.
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incurred anticompetitive injury.215 Specifically, the indirect purchaser rule limits recovery only to
direct purchasers, i.e., persons or entities who purchased price-fixed items directly from the
antitrust violator.216 This rule applies to the federal statutes217 as well as many state statutes that
do not specifically repeal the indirect purchaser rule.218 In the pharmaceutical context, indirect
purchasers (e.g., consumers) are precluded from bringing an antitrust action against those
companies that caused delayed generic entry by way of a settlement agreement.219 Thus, indirect
purchasers of pharmaceutical drugs often have no practical avenue to recover damages for
overcharged drug products.

Even in the states that recently enacted the so-called “repealer”

statutes of the indirect purchaser rule (also called “Illinois Brick repealers”), the statutes apply
prospectively.

220

Indirect purchasers in such jurisdictions cannot recover for the overcharges that

took place before the enactment of the repealer statutes. In recent years, indirect purchasers have
attempted to circumvent this rule by making claims under the state consumer protection statutes
and unjust enrichment laws, but their attempts have typically been unsuccessful. For instance,

For example, Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action, authorizing a person injured “by
reason of” an allegedly anticompetitive act to sue and recover threefold the damages, as well as the cost of suit and a
reasonable attorney's fee. See 15 U.S.C. § 15. Many state laws also provide similar remedies for private plaintiffs.
See Kurtis A. Kemper, Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on State Antitrust Claim,
35 A.L.R.6T H 245, Part II.B.§ 9 (2008).
216 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See also Kemper, supra note 215, at Part I.§ 2 (explaining that
the indirect purchaser rule “generally bars actions by retail buyers against manufacturers of price-fixed products,
subject to limited exceptions”).
217 See, e.g., Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148,
1168 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has flatly repudiated such efforts to trace damages through multiple
levels in a chain of distribution or to apportion damages between direct and indirect purchasers.”).
218 See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 409 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[E]ndpayors cannot assert antitrust claims under the law of states which have not passed [repealer statutes which
specifically grant end-payors the right to sue for antitrust violations].”).
219 Some exceptions apply. For example in In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349, 368, 370 (D. Mass.
2004), retail drug store plaintiffs were allowed recovery for their federal claims even though they were indirect
purchasers because they had been expressly assigned the rights of direct purchasers that had opted out of the direct
purchaser plaintiffs’ class.
220 In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124818, at *55 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014)
([T]he end-payor plaintiffs may not recover for any overcharges incurred before the Oregon and Rhode Island
repealer statutes took effect.).
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consumer protection statutes have requirements that cannot be easily satisfied since they apply
only to courses of conduct that are deceptive and fraudulent

as opposed to merely

anticompetitive.221 Many courts have also dismissed unjust enrichment claims brought under state
laws because they would otherwise constitute “end-runs” around state antitrust laws and
consumer-protection statutes.222
Even in states that permit indirect purchasers to bring an antitrust claim, there is the
fundamental problem of accessing private settlement agreements. This problem also plagues direct
purchasers. As time passes, it would become an increasingly daunting task for anyone to identify
any side deals related to the settlement. Individuals who were involved in settlement negotiatio ns
may be unavailable by the time an injured party contemplates an antitrust action.

In some

instances, settled parties voluntarily publish the terms of their settlement agreements.223 However,
“publicly available information contains significant gaps.”224 In In re Lipitor for example, it was
not until after limited discovery that all relevant side agreements were revealed: multiple litigatio ns
concerning two other drugs in the United States—Accupril, and Caduet—as well as twenty-three
legal proceedings in thirteen foreign countries.225 In light of Actavis, settlements of Paragraph IV
lawsuits will likely become more complex to avoid an appearance of a large, unexplained reverse
payment.226 It is questionable as to whether publicly available information is sufficient for private

221
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2014).
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Following FTC v. Actavis, 28 FALL A NT ITRUST 9, 12 (2013) (“To eliminate as much risk [of antitrust lawsuit] as
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parties to plead a cause of action that can survive a motion to dismiss or to recognize an
anticompetitive scheme to begin with.
Since settling parties in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are required to submit their agreements
to the FTC,227 one might argue that the FTC is better positioned to bring actions on behalf of the
injured members of the public who have no legal recourse. In fact, after Actavis, the FTC has
reaffirmed its plans to focus on pay for delay settlements. 228

But government agencies have

limited resources and cannot satisfy the interests of individual purchasers. Furthermore, politica l
climate could shift an agency’s focus and resources to another issue at anytime. Most significantly,
the FTC cannot always be proactive in its approach to consumer protection. Its enforceme nt
actions could take place long after consumers have been injured.
The proposed approval procedure addresses these public concerns and prevents
unnecessary injury in various ways. First, settling parties must submit their proposed agreement
to the judge who must act as a “skeptical client” and “critically examine” the terms of the
agreement for any unreasonable restriction on competition. 229 Next, if the judge decides to hold a
formal hearing, members of the public will have an opportunity to object to the proposed
agreement and identify areas that need improvement.

Any issues must be resolved before the

agreement is approved. Third, the proposed procedure requires settling parties to disclose any
undertakings that, “although seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms of the

possible, companies should . . . avoid structuring settlements that in volve unexplained high dollar payments from the
branded to the generic company . . . .”).
227 MMA, supra note 13, § 1112(c).
228 José P. Sierra, FTC reveals plans for Reverse Payment Hatch-Waxman, PHARMARISC.COM (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.pharmarisc.com/2013/08/ftc-reveals-plans-for-reverse-payment-hatch-waxman-cases/ (“Ending anticompetitive ‘pay-for-delay’ settlements is a top priority at the Federal Trade Commissio n, according to FTC
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez.”). The FTC and the Department of Justice generally believe that any reverse payment
settlements are presumptively unlawful under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Brief for the United States in Response to
the Court’s Invitation at 21–27, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG at 11, 604 F.3d 98 (2009) (No.
05-2851-cv(L)).
229 See Lopatka, supra note 121, at 889
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settlement.”230 The public would have access to settling parties’ information less any privileged
materials or work product. It would no longer be necessary for the injured parties to scour through
public records to find fragmented information on a settlement years after it goes into effect. Fourth,
the judge approving a settlement must provide his or her opinion in writing which would be
available to the public.
B. The Proposed Procedure Deters Sham Litigations
Sometimes a brand-name company can completely block competition in a particular
market through a series of settlement agreements with multiple ANDA filers.231 Suppose a brandname company has an extremely weak patent that is blocking competition in a lucrative market.
As described above, a weak patent does not warrant its owner to exclude others from
competition.232 The brand-name company initiates a patent infringement action against the firstfiler and then settles, requiring the first-filer to delay its market entry and to retain its 180-day
exclusivity.

This settlement blocks subsequent filers from entering the market until after the

expiration of the agreed-upon delay period plus 180 days, unless one of the subsequent ANDA
filers obtains an appellate court judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed.

Suppose

further that a number of the subsequent filers challenge the patent. The brand-name company sues
and then settles with each of them in order to prevent a court judgment of invalidity or noninfringement. Because of the complexities and confidential nature of these agreements, antitrust
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2.
See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229–30 (2013) (FTC filed a lawsuit against all settling parties
alleging that Solvay, the patentee, to have colluded with both the first Paragraph IV filer Actavis, Inc. and the
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delaying market entry.).
232 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[A]n invalidated patent carries with it no [] right [to exclude others from
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infringe.”) (emphasis as original).
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plaintiffs might be able to attack only some of them individually. The brand-name company might
prevail on the individual actions, even if the settlement scheme as a whole is unlawful.
Because the proposed procedure would be imposed on first-filers and subsequent filers
alike, it enables the court to identify an anticompetitive scheme before it comes to fruition. This
is achieved by requiring disclosure of any agreement in connection with settling parties’ proposed
settlement agreement. Under Rule 23(e), “[t]he spirit of [the disclosure requireme nt] is to compel
identification of any agreement or understanding that might have affected the interests of class
members by altering what they may be receiving or foregoing. Side agreements might indicate,
for example, that the settlement is not reasonable because they may reveal additional funds that
might have been paid to the class that are instead paid to selected claimants or their attorneys.” 233
Likewise, the disclosure requirement in the proposed procedure forces the settling parties to put
all potentially related transactions on the table, thereby allowing the judge to examine the parties’
motives and identify valuable considerations.

The parties may include with their disclosure

explanations as to how certain side deals do or do not relate to the proposed agreement. If any of
such side agreements signal an anticompetitive concern, the issue can be resolved before any longterm anticompetitive harm takes place. The disclosure requirement also obviates the need to
speculate illegality and spares the settling parties from expensive discovery years after the
settlement takes place.
C. The Proposed Procedure Increases Predictability and Protection for Settling Parties
The proposed procedure alleviates the concerns of settled parties that they might face
antitrust liability years after their settlement takes place. The antitrust enforcement system is
decentralized in the United States, and thus potential plaintiffs include the federal governme nt,
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M ANUAL, § 21.631 at 319.
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state governments, and aggrieved individuals. A federal antitrust action may be brought under two
federal statutes: the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 234 The FTC235 may initiate an antitrust
action under the Sherman Act against parties for collusion (Section 1) or against a single party for
engaging in monopoly (Section 2). 236 15 U.S.C. § 15c also allows state attorneys general to bring
civil actions as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons who have been injured as a result of a
violation of the Sherman Act.237 The Clayton Act authorizes private individuals who have been
injured “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” to sue and recover threefold the
damages, as well as the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee.238
For civil antitrust suits under the federal law, a cause of action must be commenced within
four years of accrual.239 An antitrust cause of action accrues when a defendant commits an act that
causes injury to the plaintiff.240

In the Hatch-Waxman context, this means that the statute of

limitations begins to run when settling parties enter into an allegedly unlawful agreement.
However, the statute of limitations is not rigid. In class action lawsuits (which is often the case
for private antitrust actions against parties to Paragraph IV settlements), “the filing of a class action
tolls the statute of limitations ‘as to all asserted members of the class.’” 241

234

The statute of

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; 5 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53. This Comment assumes that the interstate commerce
requirement of the federal statutes is satisfied.
235 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC share the responsibility of enforcing federal
antitrust laws, but only the Antitrust Division may institute criminal proceedings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
However, criminal prosecutions are relatively rare in the Hatch -Waxman context because “criminal prosecution in
general and imprisonment in particular have been confined to instances of outrageous conduct of undoubted
illegality.” Wilcox, supra note 148, at n.8 (quoting Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antirust Law § 303b
(3d ed. 2006)). Hatch-Waxman settlements do not normally fall within the category of “undoubted illegality,”
because the issue of patent validity/infringement creates uncertainty.
236 §§ 1–2.
237 § 15c.
238 § 15a. This right of action is generally limited to direct purchasers of price-fixed items, i.e., persons or entities
who directly purchase from the antitrust violator. See also discussion supra Part IV.A.
239 § 15b.
240 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971).).
241 In re Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (citing Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54
(1983) (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974))).
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limitations remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied.
Potential class members may choose to file their own suits or intervene as plaintiffs in the pending
action.”242 Therefore, parties to Paragraph IV settlements may face antitrust lawsuits from both
the FTC and private parties more than four years after the agreement date.
The settling parties could also face state antitrust actions more than four years after they
settle. Nearly all states have antitrust laws that typically authorize the state attorneys general to
bring criminal or civil actions against antitrust offenders,243 and many state laws provide remedies
for private plaintiffs.244 State statutes of limitations vary, but some states hold that the limitatio n
period begins when the plaintiff discovers the anticompetitive act as opposed to when the
defendants settle. In Rhode Island, the plaintiff must commence an action “within four (4) years
after the plaintiff discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the facts relied upon for proof of the conspiracy.”245
Some antitrust defendants have attempted to claim antitrust immunity under the NoerrPennington doctrine,246 but courts are generally in consensus that “private settlement agreements
entered into during the pendency of litigation that are neither presented to nor approved by the
judge presiding over the dispute fall outside the ambit of Noerr-Pennington immunity. ” 247
Furthermore, it is not clear whether a consent judgment falls within the scope of Noerr-
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Crown, 462 U.S. at 354.
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244 Kemper, supra note 215, at Part II.B.§ 9.
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Pennington.248 In In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, the defense was unsuccessful
because “it [was] unclear whether the judge could be fairly said to have endorsed the terms of the
settlement agreements.” 249

On the other hand, there is an indication that sufficient judicia l

intervention might lead the court to conclude that a settlement was sanctioned by a judge. In In re
Effexor Antitrust Litigation, the court deemed the payment arrangement as stipulated in the
settlement agreement justified because the judge who entered a consent decree incorporating the
settlement agreement did so after soliciting the FTC’s view on antitrust issues concerning the
agreement and the FTC decided not to object within the prescribed period.250
The proposed procedure improves predictability and builds confidence in the legality of
Paragraph IV settlement agreements in several ways. First, the proposed settlement procedure
provides a limited window of opportunity for any party (including the FTC) to object to a proposed
agreement. Those who fail to timely object forfeit their right to appeal or bring an antitrust action
based on the agreement.

Second, the court’s reasons for approval would be made publicly

available to aid future Paragraph IV litigants in structuring their agreements if they wish to settle.
Third, because courts’ approval or denial of proposed agreements would be published, precedents
will develop over time, resulting in more consistent decisions nationwide. Fourth, once a court
approves a settlement agreement, it is presumed legal. At the appellate level, the legality of an
approved agreement is reviewable only under a deferential standard.
D. The Proposed Settlement Procedure Mitigates the Power Imbalance Between the
Settling Parties

Id. (“There is little guidance, however, on the question of whether a judge's entry of a consent judgment falls
squarely within the scope of Noerr-Pennington.”).
249 See, e.g., id. at 398.
250 In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *37–40 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).
Note, however, the opinion does not specifically address the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
248
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Under the Hatch-Waxman regime, there is currently an inherent power imbalance between
brand-name companies and generic companies. This is because a Paragraph IV litigation occurs
before the generic enters the market.251 Under such circumstance, “[t]he patent owner [i.e., the
brand-name company] risks losing its patent, [but] the alleged infringer does not risk a damage
award.”252 From the generic’s perspective, the benefit of winning a lawsuit and gaining entry to a
lucrative market far outweighs the cost of litigation, and thus justifies a challenge to the patent
even with a 1.3% chance of success. 253 The power imbalance also affects settlement negotiations.
The generic company, knowing that it has little to lose by litigating, may demand a high settlement
amount, and the brand-name company would pay that amount as long as it does not exceed the
brand-name’s expected payout from winning the lawsuit.254 According to one study, brand-name
companies can pay generic manufacturers between $1.75 million and $132.5 million for a delay
period of between four months and ten years.255 Actavis provides slight leverage in negotiatio ns
for brand-name companies because “unexplained” and “large” reverse payments raise red flags,
but the basic power balance has not changed.
Within the proposed settlement framework, courts are in a unique position to mitigate this
imbalance and manage both parties’ interests. For example, the court may raise concerns when
the generic company demands payment that is unreasonably high or market entry date that is too
soon. This way, the court acts to protect the brand-name company's need to recover its investme nt
in research, which ensures continued development of new drugs.
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generic entry at an appropriate time prior to the patent expiration, it can facilitate an equitable and
pro-competitive timing to introduce lower-cost generic drugs into the market.
E. The Proposed Procedure Likely Enhances Predictability Which in Turn Encourages
Innovation
The current regulatory system does not necessarily “induce name-brand pharmaceutica l
firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”256
As with any for-profit enterprise, a brand-name company’s decision to invest in research is driven
by economic factors. Because pharmaceutical companies can spend up to $5 billion to develop a
single drug,257 each drug that enters the market must generate enough profit to exceed these costs.
R&D costs, however, are not the only financial concerns related to product development.258 A
brand-name company may also take into account the likelihood of generics’ market entry,259 the
cost of future litigations (including potential antitrust litigations), and the probability of successful
settlement(s). 260 If the occurrence of future antitrust litigation is so unpredictable, companies
might overestimate the associated costs and shy away from particular research projects altogether.
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Even if a brand-name company decides to engage in R&D, uncertainty as to the antitrust
legality of settlements may still cause the brand-name company to inflate the non-R&D costs. The
overestimation is justifiable since the FTC interprets the Actavis decision to be a “significa nt
victory for the Commission.”261 Therefore, brand-name companies will likely factor in expected
costs of antitrust litigations when determining drug prices, effectively shifting the costs to
consumers.262
The proposed procedure would improve predictability as to the volume of future antitrust
lawsuits, because settling parties can structure their agreements in conformity with precedents.
Furthermore, since an approved agreement is presumed legal, the likelihood that settled companies
would face antitrust liability diminishes significantly.

Thus, brand-name companies would be

encouraged to invest in R&D and less reluctant to lower drug prices.
One commentator on reverse payment settlements has proposed a model that demonstrates
the effect of the shift in legality of reverse payment settlements. 263

According to the model,

switching from a regime that legalizes reverse payment settlements to a regime that illegalizes the
settlements increases incentives for brand-name companies to develop stronger inventions rather
than weaker inventions, therefore strengthening their patents. 264 The model also shows that a
move toward illegalization of reverse payment settlement deters generics from entering the market
when the patent is strong. 265

The proposed procedure does not illegalize reverse payment

settlements, but makes it difficult for brand-name companies to rely on them. If this model
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accurately forecasts the behaviors of brand-name and generic companies, the proposed procedure
would encourage strong innovation.
V.

Conclusion

The current method of settling Paragraph IV litigations is replete with problems. Because
the Actavis framework is full of uncertainties, settling parties currently cannot ensure the antitrust
legality of their agreements. The parties could be subject to antitrust scrutiny several years after
the settlement, which requires them to revisit their settled case and incur additional costs. The
power imbalance between brand-name and generic companies in Paragraph IV litigations as well
as anticipated antitrust lawsuits may cause brand-name companies to divert resources from R&D
and shift costs to consumers. On the other hand, interested members of the public cannot intervene
before Paragraph IV settlements are finalized and are unable to escape the effects of the settlement
terms. Many of the consumers who are injured as a result of a Paragraph IV settlement have no
legal recourse under the indirect purchaser rule, and even the ones who are entitled to bring an
antitrust action may not have access to relevant information.
The proposed procedure modeled after Rule 23(e) attempts to alleviate some of the
problems surrounding the parties to Paragraph IV settlements. Most significantly, it provides a
process through which settling parties can obtain judicial approval of their agreement.

Once

approved, an agreement is presumptively legal, which protects the settled parties from future
antitrust scrutiny. Moreover, since courts would be required to issue an opinion describing their
reasons for approval or disapproval of each proposed agreement, settling parties would be able to
utilize past court decisions as a guide to structure their agreement.
The proposed procedure also addresses some of the public’s concerns. First, settling parties
would be required to submit their proposed agreement to the court before they can settle. The
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court has the authority to reject any anticompetitive agreement and therefore prevent antitrust
injury to the public.

Second, settling parties must also submit any ancillary agreements in

connection with their proposed agreement. This obviates the need for interested members of the
public to search for related side deals. If settling parties fail to disclose any material informatio n,
their agreement would lose its presumptive legality. Third, the proposed procedure provides an
opportunity for members of the public to object to a proposed agreement before it goes into effect.
Fourth, the settling parties must adhere to a strict timeline, and the parties’ options become limited
once they express their intent to settle.

This prevents the parties’ ability to manipulate the

settlement procedure.
The proposed procedure is intended to improve certainty as to the antitrust legality of
Paragraph IV settlements and prevent unnecessary injury to the public. This Comment makes no
claim that the proposed procedure is ideal, and it would likely require further adjustments.
Nonetheless, the current mechanisms for settlement and antitrust enforcement do not adequately
balance the competing needs to promote pharmaceutical innovation and public welfare. A more
preemptive and drastic approach is necessary and desirable.
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